<p>In epistemology, source reliabilism is typically defined in terms of truth-conduciveness. Yet many sources consistently provide accurate information while serving non-epistemic ends. This paper examines such cases of ‘dishonest truth’—ranging from partisan media to strategic advertising—where factual accuracy masks manipulative intent. I argue that these sources fail to meet the conditions of epistemic reliability despite their truth-conduciveness, as they generate a distinctive form of luck—intentional luck—that renders the truth accidental relative to the source’s intentions. Consequently, beliefs formed through such sources represent a new class of Gettier-style cases: they are justified and non-accidentally true but result in epistemic alienation, falling short of knowledge because they lack the relational integrity that genuine informing demands. To address this, I propose an Honesty Condition on both epistemic reliability and testimonial knowledge, requiring that communicative practices be not only truth-conducive but also epistemically oriented. This perspective affirms a deontological-epistemic dimension at the core of social epistemology, essential for protecting the social infrastructure of trust.</p>