<p>In this paper, Kuhn’s (The structure of scientific revolutions, University of Chicago Press, 1970) image of science, as portrayed in his <i>The Structure of Scientific Revolutions</i>, is examined in the face of the recent interdisciplinary turn in scientific practice. It is argued that, considering the actual productivity of interdisciplinary research, Kuhn’s characterization of different scientific traditions as incommensurable is outdated and largely false. This conclusion relies on the following argument: (P₁) If different scientific traditions are incommensurable, the productivity of interdisciplinary research must be extremely low. (P₂) The productivity of interdisciplinary research is not extremely low. Hence, different scientific traditions are not incommensurable. To clarify and defend this argument, Kuhn’s account of incommensurability is clarified, as well as what interdisciplinary research is. It is argued that this account of incommensurability involves methodological, semantic, and perceptual aspects and that interdisciplinary research is research that is based on an integration of two or more disciplines focused on a common problem. Then, the argument’s premises, P₁-P₂, are defended, and its conclusion is discussed. It is argued that if philosophers of science wish to remain scientifically-informed, they must abandon Kuhn’s image of science where different scientific traditions are incommensurable. Instead, philosophers of science should embrace an image of science that grants the sciences a broader common basis than the one Kuhn grants.</p>