<p>The minimal self hypothesis holds that the inherent sense of “for-me-ness” or “mineness” in every plain conscious experience provides a basic solution to the problem of self-individuation: namely, how to establish intrasubjective unity and intersubjective boundary. I advance two objections to this account. First, the minimal self hypothesis fails to present the most parsimonious conception of the experience-experiencer relation. Instead, it smuggles the private/public contrast into the characterization of a plain experience through the linguistic terms “self” and “me.” Second, this hypothesis is theoretically infertile. It accounts for neither the origin of the first/third-person distinction nor the heterogeneity of disownership phenomena. As an alternative, I propose a functional fragmentation of the minimal self into more fundamental concepts of “subject,” which I call “proto-subjects” or “subjective guises.” These functional fragments of the minimal self are conceptually exhausted by their specific theoretical roles. Their convergence and divergence under certain principles can explain the diversity of disownership disorders and provide a substantive analysis of the first- and third-person perspectives. For phenomenologists open to drawing inferences from observable facts, the explanatory benefits of this fragmentation proposal balance its associated costs.</p>