<p>Disjunctivism about responding to reasons maintains that responding to normative reasons and responding to motivating reasons are fundamentally different conditions neither of which can be analyzed in terms of the other. This paper argues against disjunctivism and defends <i>the factoring account of responding to normative reasons</i> according to which the fact that an agent responds to a normative reason is grounded upon the facts that (i) there is a true consideration that provides that normative reason, (ii) she possesses that consideration as a normative reason, and (iii) she is rationally motivated by that consideration (as a motivating reason) to do what it supports. As I argue, recent arguments against the factoring account rest on impoverished conceptions of what it is to possess a normative reason. Accordingly, by defending the factoring account the paper helps deepen our understanding of the notion of possessing normative reasons.</p>