<p>Some argue that philosophical inquiry is an a priori affair that can be pursued “from the armchair,” whereas others argue that empirical evidence plays an important role as well. One way to investigate this question is by carefully examining what philosophers ordinarily do—that is, what mainstream philosophical practice actually involves. Hence, I analyzed bibliometric records from tens of thousands of articles published in prestigious, generalist philosophy journals over the past half-century. I found that philosophers frequently, and increasingly, cite empirical sources and discuss empirical research. Moreover, philosophy articles that are more empirically-engaged are also more influential. These findings suggest that empirical evidence does play a significant role in philosophical inquiry. Although it doesn’t follow that it <i>ought</i> to, these descriptive facts about philosophical practice shift the burden of proof in debates about that normative question. Finally, I argue that, because engaging with empirical evidence is a normal part of doing philosophy, students should receive at least some basic training in empirical methods.</p>

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The role of empirical evidence in philosophy

  • Michael Prinzing

摘要

Some argue that philosophical inquiry is an a priori affair that can be pursued “from the armchair,” whereas others argue that empirical evidence plays an important role as well. One way to investigate this question is by carefully examining what philosophers ordinarily do—that is, what mainstream philosophical practice actually involves. Hence, I analyzed bibliometric records from tens of thousands of articles published in prestigious, generalist philosophy journals over the past half-century. I found that philosophers frequently, and increasingly, cite empirical sources and discuss empirical research. Moreover, philosophy articles that are more empirically-engaged are also more influential. These findings suggest that empirical evidence does play a significant role in philosophical inquiry. Although it doesn’t follow that it ought to, these descriptive facts about philosophical practice shift the burden of proof in debates about that normative question. Finally, I argue that, because engaging with empirical evidence is a normal part of doing philosophy, students should receive at least some basic training in empirical methods.