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<p>Thought experiments (TEs) are indispensable conceptual tools in scientific research, particularly in the study of quantum gravity. Many scholars argue that the epistemic significance of TEs hinges on the proper and ineliminable use of imagination. However, there is disagreement regarding the specific nature of the imagination involved. A valuable perspective on this debate is provided by a TE proposed by Matvei Bronstein in 1936 to support a quantum theory of gravity. His contribution serves as a notable example of destructive TE, aiming to highlight the internal inconsistency within a unified theory of both quantum mechanics and general relativity. In this paper, I reconstruct Bronstein’s TE in the context of recent discussions on the relationship between TEs and imagination. I argue that this case study challenges existing epistemological frameworks for understanding TEs. I contend that Bronstein’s TE introduces a new form of imagination, termed <i>operational imagination</i>, as indispensable for reaching its intended conclusion. I conclude that operational imagination can be integrated into simulative model-based accounts of TEs.</p>

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Imagining at the threshold: thought experiments and constraints in quantum gravity

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年5月7日

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  • Enrico Maresca

摘要

Thought experiments (TEs) are indispensable conceptual tools in scientific research, particularly in the study of quantum gravity. Many scholars argue that the epistemic significance of TEs hinges on the proper and ineliminable use of imagination. However, there is disagreement regarding the specific nature of the imagination involved. A valuable perspective on this debate is provided by a TE proposed by Matvei Bronstein in 1936 to support a quantum theory of gravity. His contribution serves as a notable example of destructive TE, aiming to highlight the internal inconsistency within a unified theory of both quantum mechanics and general relativity. In this paper, I reconstruct Bronstein’s TE in the context of recent discussions on the relationship between TEs and imagination. I argue that this case study challenges existing epistemological frameworks for understanding TEs. I contend that Bronstein’s TE introduces a new form of imagination, termed operational imagination, as indispensable for reaching its intended conclusion. I conclude that operational imagination can be integrated into simulative model-based accounts of TEs.