Scholarlink

<p>Rach Cosker-Rowland argues for a promising view of gender based on “fittingness”; to judge someone to be gender G is to judge it to be fitting to apply the norms for Gs to that person, and to have the gender identity ‘G’ is to take it to be fitting for oneself to be judged according to the norms for Gs. I defend a version of this view against the critique, from Viktoria Knoll, that it makes all assertions of gender out to be normative assertions about how one ought to treat others. I argue that we should recast fittingness as a relation of warrant between the upstream conditions of a language game move and its downstream consequences. This yields a minimalist version of fittingness for gender avowals and attributions that locates normativity not in their semantic content - the thing that worries Knoll - but in the obligations and entitlements taken on by speakers <i>qua</i> language game players (what Robert Brandom calls their “deontic score”). I demonstrate how this allows us to unify the two halves of Cosker-Rowland’s view more neatly than is otherwise possible, thus avoiding issues of circularity that afflict similar identity-first views of gender, and that threaten the fittingness view.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

Locating normativity in the fitting treatment account of gender

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年3月23日

查看全文
  • Evie Willems

摘要

Rach Cosker-Rowland argues for a promising view of gender based on “fittingness”; to judge someone to be gender G is to judge it to be fitting to apply the norms for Gs to that person, and to have the gender identity ‘G’ is to take it to be fitting for oneself to be judged according to the norms for Gs. I defend a version of this view against the critique, from Viktoria Knoll, that it makes all assertions of gender out to be normative assertions about how one ought to treat others. I argue that we should recast fittingness as a relation of warrant between the upstream conditions of a language game move and its downstream consequences. This yields a minimalist version of fittingness for gender avowals and attributions that locates normativity not in their semantic content - the thing that worries Knoll - but in the obligations and entitlements taken on by speakers qua language game players (what Robert Brandom calls their “deontic score”). I demonstrate how this allows us to unify the two halves of Cosker-Rowland’s view more neatly than is otherwise possible, thus avoiding issues of circularity that afflict similar identity-first views of gender, and that threaten the fittingness view.