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<p>A number of recent philosophers have argued that our first-personal access to our beliefs is explained by the fact that we make <i>transparent transitions</i>: causal transitions between worldly mental states and second-order beliefs based on those worldly mental states. In this paper, I argue (i) that our first-personal access to some <i>past</i> beliefs cannot be explained by transparent transitions and (ii) that this casts doubt on the view that our first-personal access to any of our beliefs, past or present, is explained by transparent transitions. I argue further that the same problem arises for transitional theories for other mental states, such as desires.</p>

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Transparency and past beliefs

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年3月23日

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  • Luke Capek

摘要

A number of recent philosophers have argued that our first-personal access to our beliefs is explained by the fact that we make transparent transitions: causal transitions between worldly mental states and second-order beliefs based on those worldly mental states. In this paper, I argue (i) that our first-personal access to some past beliefs cannot be explained by transparent transitions and (ii) that this casts doubt on the view that our first-personal access to any of our beliefs, past or present, is explained by transparent transitions. I argue further that the same problem arises for transitional theories for other mental states, such as desires.