<p>I will argue for two related theses: (i) it is an interest-relative fact whether some metaphysical view counts as monist, and (ii) ‘monism’ can be given a schematic via negativa characterization which says that <i>Φ</i> monism which excludes some property type P in some world W iff only not-P properties are instantiated in W. Property type P can be fundamental, but this is not necessary. As a consequence, it only makes sense to think of monism relative to one or another property type of interest. Classic examples are fundamental mental, normative or abstract properties, but one can imagine other sorts of monism that might be of philosophical interest (e.g. structural properties). Physics-based physicalism satisfies this schema, stipulating that physicalism is true so long as there are no fundamental properties which are not posited by our best physics (regardless of what “best physics” means). I will also argue that my understanding of monism has no supervenience requirement.</p>