<p>In this paper, we investigate the use of non-epistemic values in the communication of scientific information. We examine how values, by way of the precautionary principle, have been used to move from a deeply uncertain scientific concept, climate tipping points, to a metaphor which promotes political action. We argue that the precautionary principle has been used to produce a metaphor which idealizes the tipping point context. The idealization highlights specific features that are relevant for decision-making, including the potential for catastrophe, while omitting others, such as the deep uncertainty related to specific climate tipping points. We discuss the negative impacts of using precautionary principle-like reasoning when communicating about tipping points, highlighting the potential to (1) mischaracterize the uncertainty present within the decision-making context, and (2) further politicize a scientific debate to the point of <i>hyperpolarization</i>. We conclude that when communicating about deeply uncertain events the precautionary principle ought to be used as a meta-principle directed at the research community, the more-research-needed argument, rather than as a decision-making principle for policy.</p>