<p>There is a certain obscurantist craft by which a speaker’s words, deep or profound as they may seem, are so unclear that they frustrate the interpreter’s hermeneutical efforts. In the end, the interpreter may come to doubt her hermeneutical competencies while inflating her perception of the obscurantist’s epistemic status. The interpreter epistemically subordinates herself, in this way, to the obscurantist. In this paper, I elucidate the nature of this ‘subordinative obscurantism’ and examine its epistemically manipulative applications. I also discuss how subordinative obscurantist manipulation can be used in conjunction with another epistemic manipulation strategy rooted in the use of <i>clear</i>-seeming speech, thereby setting especially pernicious cognitive traps for victims. Finally, I discuss the epistemic status of the beliefs formed by victims of subordinative obscurantist manipulation.</p>