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<p>The Social Knowledge (SK) view of group knowledge holds that a group can know that p without any of its members having any awareness that p at all (Bird, Philosophical Perspectives 24, 2010). Some reject SK because it seems to sever the connection between knowledge and action. I argue that this style of objection to SK—the <i>Rational Action Objection</i> (RAO)—fails because it assumes a crucial premise linking the rationality of a group’s action to the rationality of its members’ actions. Without this missing premise, the argument is invalid. Moreover, I argue that the needed premise (1) subtly begs the question against SK and (2) implausibly rules out the possibility of conflicts between individual and collective rationality. The upshot: groups, like individuals, may have reasons to act but be unable to act on those reasons. Thus, SK can respect the connection between knowledge and action.</p>

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Social knowledge and rational group action

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年2月13日

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  • Joshua Brecka

摘要

The Social Knowledge (SK) view of group knowledge holds that a group can know that p without any of its members having any awareness that p at all (Bird, Philosophical Perspectives 24, 2010). Some reject SK because it seems to sever the connection between knowledge and action. I argue that this style of objection to SK—the Rational Action Objection (RAO)—fails because it assumes a crucial premise linking the rationality of a group’s action to the rationality of its members’ actions. Without this missing premise, the argument is invalid. Moreover, I argue that the needed premise (1) subtly begs the question against SK and (2) implausibly rules out the possibility of conflicts between individual and collective rationality. The upshot: groups, like individuals, may have reasons to act but be unable to act on those reasons. Thus, SK can respect the connection between knowledge and action.