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<p>There is an old worry to the effect that all valid arguments are circular. As Mill originally argued, the conclusion of a valid argument must be already assumed in its premise set. The sense of “being assumed in” is somewhat vague but makes perfect intuitive sense, given that valid reasoning is non-ampliative. Hence, if the argument’s conclusion were to express some information over and above what its premise set expresses, the argument would be invalid. After all, the truth of its premises would not necessitate the truth of its conclusion, a clear mark of invalidity. Moreover, if the argument’s conclusion already resides in its premise set, the argument is characterized by so-called premise circularity. Therefore, rather alarmingly, validity seems to entail premise-circularity. The worry is revisited by Fulmer (Synthese 204:1-30, 2024), published in this journal, with the help of sharp analytic conceptual apparatus. Fulmer (Synthese 204:1-30, 2024) argues that “[n]early every single valid argument “ exhibit circularity. However, I submit that the circularity of a valid argument does not bar its persuasiveness. Hence, some circular arguments are informative and non-fallacious, whereas some others are not. Therefore, circularity per se does not constitute a decisive criticism of valid arguments.</p>

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Is circularity a threat to persuasiveness: revisiting the problem of begging the question

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年1月14日

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  • Igor Wysocki

摘要

There is an old worry to the effect that all valid arguments are circular. As Mill originally argued, the conclusion of a valid argument must be already assumed in its premise set. The sense of “being assumed in” is somewhat vague but makes perfect intuitive sense, given that valid reasoning is non-ampliative. Hence, if the argument’s conclusion were to express some information over and above what its premise set expresses, the argument would be invalid. After all, the truth of its premises would not necessitate the truth of its conclusion, a clear mark of invalidity. Moreover, if the argument’s conclusion already resides in its premise set, the argument is characterized by so-called premise circularity. Therefore, rather alarmingly, validity seems to entail premise-circularity. The worry is revisited by Fulmer (Synthese 204:1-30, 2024), published in this journal, with the help of sharp analytic conceptual apparatus. Fulmer (Synthese 204:1-30, 2024) argues that “[n]early every single valid argument “ exhibit circularity. However, I submit that the circularity of a valid argument does not bar its persuasiveness. Hence, some circular arguments are informative and non-fallacious, whereas some others are not. Therefore, circularity per se does not constitute a decisive criticism of valid arguments.