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<p>The truth norm’s minimal characterization is that whenever a doxastic agent is presented with a proposition <i>p</i>, they ought to believe <i>p</i> if and only if <i>p</i> is true. Bykvist and Hattiangadi (Analysis 67:277–285, 2007; The aim of belief, 100–122, 2013) have argued that the truth norm is incoherent because it puts agents under unsatisfiable normative requirements. In this paper, I develop and defend a new version of the truth norm that overcomes Bykvist &amp; Hattiangadi’s objection. This new truth norm time-indexes doxastic obligations, an important factor that has been neglected in discussions of it so far. The result is an improved truth norm that captures the intuitive view that doxastic agents only ought to believe true propositions <i>while</i> they are true. This version does not entail unsatisfiable normative requirements, and thus is immune to Bykvist &amp; Hattiangadi’s objection. Along the way, it is argued that when ascertaining doxastic norms about whether or not we ought to believe a proposition, there are several temporal factors that make a difference. Doxastic norms apply to us relative to <i>when</i> we consider a proposition, <i>when</i> that proposition is true, and <i>when</i> that proposition is believable. It does not simply matter <i>what</i> we ought to believe, but <i>when</i> we ought to believe it.</p>

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The truth norm’s time-indexed obligations

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年1月14日

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  • Felipe E. Oliveira

摘要

The truth norm’s minimal characterization is that whenever a doxastic agent is presented with a proposition p, they ought to believe p if and only if p is true. Bykvist and Hattiangadi (Analysis 67:277–285, 2007; The aim of belief, 100–122, 2013) have argued that the truth norm is incoherent because it puts agents under unsatisfiable normative requirements. In this paper, I develop and defend a new version of the truth norm that overcomes Bykvist & Hattiangadi’s objection. This new truth norm time-indexes doxastic obligations, an important factor that has been neglected in discussions of it so far. The result is an improved truth norm that captures the intuitive view that doxastic agents only ought to believe true propositions while they are true. This version does not entail unsatisfiable normative requirements, and thus is immune to Bykvist & Hattiangadi’s objection. Along the way, it is argued that when ascertaining doxastic norms about whether or not we ought to believe a proposition, there are several temporal factors that make a difference. Doxastic norms apply to us relative to when we consider a proposition, when that proposition is true, and when that proposition is believable. It does not simply matter what we ought to believe, but when we ought to believe it.