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<p>When moral and epistemic norms pull in different directions, what should one believe? Moral encroachment is the view that there is an ought simpliciter that is determined by both moral and epistemic norms. Others, on the other hand, hold that norms of different domains cannot be combined and can therefore give conflicting verdicts. This view, however, may run into Moorean paradoxes. This paper argues for a view in which moral and epistemic norms remain distinct, but in a way that does not run into paradoxes, by adopting and expanding Angela Smith’s view of a three-tiered structure of responsibility attributions (Smith, <CitationRef CitationID="CR62">2007</CitationRef>) and arguing for a view of responsibility for beliefs according to which background attitudes play a pivotal role in belief-forming processes. These background attitudes affect how evidence is gathered and weighed, and thus they not only determine what beliefs the agent rationally ought to form (Nelson, <CitationRef CitationID="CR48">2010</CitationRef>) but also indirectly influence the content of the belief. A belief may thus reveal a morally problematic attitude, for instance, but there is rarely a point at which an agent is conscious of different norms pulling in different directions.</p>

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Ambiguity of doxastic ought and responsibility for belief

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年1月14日

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  • Ninni Suni

摘要

When moral and epistemic norms pull in different directions, what should one believe? Moral encroachment is the view that there is an ought simpliciter that is determined by both moral and epistemic norms. Others, on the other hand, hold that norms of different domains cannot be combined and can therefore give conflicting verdicts. This view, however, may run into Moorean paradoxes. This paper argues for a view in which moral and epistemic norms remain distinct, but in a way that does not run into paradoxes, by adopting and expanding Angela Smith’s view of a three-tiered structure of responsibility attributions (Smith, 2007) and arguing for a view of responsibility for beliefs according to which background attitudes play a pivotal role in belief-forming processes. These background attitudes affect how evidence is gathered and weighed, and thus they not only determine what beliefs the agent rationally ought to form (Nelson, 2010) but also indirectly influence the content of the belief. A belief may thus reveal a morally problematic attitude, for instance, but there is rarely a point at which an agent is conscious of different norms pulling in different directions.