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<p>In this article, I develop a rational reconstruction of Hasok Chang’s (2012) “active normative epistemic pluralism” (ANEP). I identify the main conceptual resources Chang uses to define and support ANEP, and I assess the extent to which those resources vindicate his claim that the view both avoids relativism and yields a beneficial plurality of scientific “systems of practice” (Chang, The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, 2009, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25(3): 205–221, 2011, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 117(2): 103–122, 2017f, Reasoning in measurement. Routledge, pp. 25–38, 2017i). On the basis of this reconstruction, I argue that Chang assumes, rather than demonstrates, that ANEP can exclude from its remit inquisitive arrangements that are widely regarded as scientifically suspect, such as astrology. I then formulate desiderata for any version of ANEP that aims to non-arbitrarily exclude practices commonly labelled “pseudo-scientific” or “non-scientific”. I argue that these desiderata are difficult to satisfy not only for ANEP, but for any epistemic pluralism that relies on epistemic values or epistemic contexts to constrain what counts as “science” or “scientific”. The core difficulty is to non-arbitrarily assess the comparative legitimacy of different interpretations of familiar epistemic values, such as predictive power and explanatory strength, when those interpretations are grounded in distinct meta-epistemic commitments. I support this diagnosis with an exploratory argument that draws on recent work in hinge epistemology (Coliva, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6(2–3): 79–96, 2016, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10(3–4): 346–366, 2020; Kusch, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6(2–3): 120–142, 2016).</p>

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Reading Chang’s pluralism: constraints, question-begging, and interpreting epistemic values

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年1月14日

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  • Anish Seal

摘要

In this article, I develop a rational reconstruction of Hasok Chang’s (2012) “active normative epistemic pluralism” (ANEP). I identify the main conceptual resources Chang uses to define and support ANEP, and I assess the extent to which those resources vindicate his claim that the view both avoids relativism and yields a beneficial plurality of scientific “systems of practice” (Chang, The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, 2009, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25(3): 205–221, 2011, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 117(2): 103–122, 2017f, Reasoning in measurement. Routledge, pp. 25–38, 2017i). On the basis of this reconstruction, I argue that Chang assumes, rather than demonstrates, that ANEP can exclude from its remit inquisitive arrangements that are widely regarded as scientifically suspect, such as astrology. I then formulate desiderata for any version of ANEP that aims to non-arbitrarily exclude practices commonly labelled “pseudo-scientific” or “non-scientific”. I argue that these desiderata are difficult to satisfy not only for ANEP, but for any epistemic pluralism that relies on epistemic values or epistemic contexts to constrain what counts as “science” or “scientific”. The core difficulty is to non-arbitrarily assess the comparative legitimacy of different interpretations of familiar epistemic values, such as predictive power and explanatory strength, when those interpretations are grounded in distinct meta-epistemic commitments. I support this diagnosis with an exploratory argument that draws on recent work in hinge epistemology (Coliva, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6(2–3): 79–96, 2016, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10(3–4): 346–366, 2020; Kusch, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6(2–3): 120–142, 2016).