<p>This paper examines scientific gatekeeping during the COVID-19 pandemic through two key episodes: the suppression of the Great Barrington Declaration’s critique of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) and the pre-mature, prejudicial dismissal of the lab leak hypothesis regarding SARS-CoV-2‘s origins. Drawing on public choice theory, I argue that scientist-bureaucrats’ gatekeeping behaviors were motivated not solely by epistemic goals or public good, but by three distinct incentives: enhancing public perception of their importance, increasing political influence, and protecting captured resources. Analysis of communications between key figures like Fauci, Collins, and Anderson, along with the history of early 21<sup>st</sup> century pandemic preparedness debates in the United States, reveals discrepancies between private uncertainties and public pronouncements. The paper proposes a “public choice philosophy of science” framework to understand how scientist-bureaucrats operate when their avowed goal is advancing public good rather than knowledge. This approach helps explain why scientific disagreement was suppressed during the pandemic despite its value for both scientific progress and public trust.</p>

错误:搜索内容不能为空,请输入英文关键词
错误:关键词超出字数限制,请精简
高级检索

Bureaucratic science: a public choice analysis of gatekeeping during COVID-19

  • Eric Winsberg

摘要

This paper examines scientific gatekeeping during the COVID-19 pandemic through two key episodes: the suppression of the Great Barrington Declaration’s critique of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) and the pre-mature, prejudicial dismissal of the lab leak hypothesis regarding SARS-CoV-2‘s origins. Drawing on public choice theory, I argue that scientist-bureaucrats’ gatekeeping behaviors were motivated not solely by epistemic goals or public good, but by three distinct incentives: enhancing public perception of their importance, increasing political influence, and protecting captured resources. Analysis of communications between key figures like Fauci, Collins, and Anderson, along with the history of early 21st century pandemic preparedness debates in the United States, reveals discrepancies between private uncertainties and public pronouncements. The paper proposes a “public choice philosophy of science” framework to understand how scientist-bureaucrats operate when their avowed goal is advancing public good rather than knowledge. This approach helps explain why scientific disagreement was suppressed during the pandemic despite its value for both scientific progress and public trust.