<p>Action explanations are answers given to questions of the form: “Why did <i>A ϕ</i>?” Explanatory reasons are the explanantia of such explanations. In the last 25 years, various accounts on the nature of explanatory reasons have been presented. According to factivism, for instance, explanatory reasons are the facts that the agent believed and acted on. According to psychologism, in turn, explanatory reasons are the agent’s beliefs themselves. The primary goal of this paper is to show that there are cases in which an action explanation is required but that none of the predominant accounts can deal with. A secondary goal is to show that the predominant accounts have also misunderstood the exact purpose of action explanations. Action explanations – given as answers to questions of the form “Why did <i>A ϕ</i>?” – are not supposed to explain actions simpliciter. They are supposed to explain actions under a description that the questioner chose.</p>

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Explanatory reasons, actions, and the right fit

  • Robert Reimer

摘要

Action explanations are answers given to questions of the form: “Why did A ϕ?” Explanatory reasons are the explanantia of such explanations. In the last 25 years, various accounts on the nature of explanatory reasons have been presented. According to factivism, for instance, explanatory reasons are the facts that the agent believed and acted on. According to psychologism, in turn, explanatory reasons are the agent’s beliefs themselves. The primary goal of this paper is to show that there are cases in which an action explanation is required but that none of the predominant accounts can deal with. A secondary goal is to show that the predominant accounts have also misunderstood the exact purpose of action explanations. Action explanations – given as answers to questions of the form “Why did A ϕ?” – are not supposed to explain actions simpliciter. They are supposed to explain actions under a description that the questioner chose.