<p>What is assertion? In this paper, leading theories are surveyed and found to be too restrictive. For every effect, intention, norm, or commitment that has been proposed as essential to assertion, we can find cases where assertions apparently lack this feature. The underlying problem is that proponents of these “strong” theories have focused only on the role of assertion in specific kinds of linguistic practices, regarded as typical or paradigmatic. However, the versatility of assertoric speech reveals this to be a dubious strategy for identifying the essential nature of the speech act. In the second part of the paper, I try out an alternative approach. The idea is to first identify only the most basic thing a speaker does when they make an assertion. The “Minimal Theory” of assertion then claims that this is <i>all there is</i> to asserting. I consider various ways we might be compelled to go beyond the Minimal Theory, but argue that, once appropriately refined, it stands as an adequate account of the speech act.</p>