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<p>In this paper we argue that the problem of conspiracy theories circulating through specific social groups runs deeper than is appreciated. The epistemic networks involved in the propagation of conspiracy theories cannot always be deemed to be irrational, with motivated reasoning at their heart. There are, after all, rational epistemic bubbles—those that rightly ignore unreliable information sources. We provide a rational reconstruction of conspiratorial thinking, which suggests that, under such a characterisation, many interventions aimed at reducing conspiracy belief are no longer tenable. In particular, we argue that popular <i>competence</i> and <i>containment</i> strategies discussed in the philosophical and psychological literatures and pursued by governments and social media corporations are not fit for purpose.</p>

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Do conspiracy-theory interventions rest on a mistake?

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年9月10日

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  • Mark Colyvan,
  • Tim Smartt,
  • Hannah Tierney

摘要

In this paper we argue that the problem of conspiracy theories circulating through specific social groups runs deeper than is appreciated. The epistemic networks involved in the propagation of conspiracy theories cannot always be deemed to be irrational, with motivated reasoning at their heart. There are, after all, rational epistemic bubbles—those that rightly ignore unreliable information sources. We provide a rational reconstruction of conspiratorial thinking, which suggests that, under such a characterisation, many interventions aimed at reducing conspiracy belief are no longer tenable. In particular, we argue that popular competence and containment strategies discussed in the philosophical and psychological literatures and pursued by governments and social media corporations are not fit for purpose.