<p>This article contributes to contemporary debates in the philosophy of habit by challenging the widespread tendency to conceive of habits primarily as automatic, rigid responses to environmental cues. It advocates for a richer conception grounded in the enactive theory of sensorimotor agency developed by Di Paolo, Buhrmann, and Barandiaran in their book <i>Sensorimotor Life: An Enactive Proposal.</i> The paper begins by pointing out the foundational role that habits play in the enactive account of cognition, emphasising its shift from prevalent stimulus-response, associationist conceptions of habit towards an organicist perspective that underscores its relational, holistic, and dynamic nature. It then analyses the technical definition of habit put forward by Di Paolo et al., underscoring its novel elements, while also identifying a limitation: its restriction to sensorimotor schemes leaves out habitual behaviours unfolding over longer timescales. Drawing on their theoretical resources, I propose an expanded account that encompasses activities and regional identities. This broader, multi-scale conception aims to offer a more comprehensive understanding of habit that bridges the gap between individual sensorimotor schemes and lifelong patterns of identity formation.</p>