<p>As a basis for his extensionist theory on the philosophy of the mind Andy Clark attempts to provide a positive definition of the human as a natural-born cyborg, connecting it to Arnold Gehlen’s idea of the deficient being (Mängelwesen). This natural-born cyborg is a being whose cognition relies on the engagement in new kinds of perception-action-cycles with their external world - usually with the help of technology - thereby creating a systemic whole with this external world. Questions about how humans are defined by their interactions with technology have also been posed in trans- and posthumanist discourses. These discourses have a tendency to leave gaps concerning what the difference between a human and a posthuman is, which leads to problems in regards to defining a praxis for realizing the technological utopia proposed by transhumanism. Defining the human as a natural-born cyborg might provide further insight into the anthropological aspects of a transhumanist praxis but it might also diminish the call to action inherent in transhumanism. In this paper, I aim to show how this concept fits into existing trans- and posthumanist discourses. I intend to explore the potential benefits as well as drawbacks and I will argue that trans- and posthumanist discourses can benefit from extensionist perspectives regarding to their anthropological groundwork, but that these perspectives can only fit into these discourses to a certain extent due to their utopian content.</p>