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<p>Contemporary discussions about the ethics of belief do not often refer to ancient philosophy when coming to conclusions about ethics or belief. However, Plato’s cognitive framework is still generative for insights on how to connect beliefs to ethics, specifically with regard to current considerations about virtue in ethics. In Plato’s ethics, in order to attain virtue, agents are epistemically obligated to provide a rational account for their <i>orthe-doxa</i>, correct opinion or belief. Such <i>orthe-doxa</i> includes the obligation of adhering to specific propositions as correct. Attaining a virtuous state necessitates the alignment of all components of the soul through cooperative effort, achieved by the obligatory obedience of the lower parts of the soul, the <i>epithumetikon</i> and the <i>thumoeides</i>, to the <i>logistikon</i>. The <i>thumoeides</i> is both cognitive and desiderative, such that it voluntarily submits to <i>logos</i>, thus rendering its obligation epistemic. Without the epistemic obligation of the <i>thumoeides</i>, an orderly virtuous state would remain unattainable.</p>

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Plato’s ethics of belief

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年10月7日

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  • Eric C. Brook

摘要

Contemporary discussions about the ethics of belief do not often refer to ancient philosophy when coming to conclusions about ethics or belief. However, Plato’s cognitive framework is still generative for insights on how to connect beliefs to ethics, specifically with regard to current considerations about virtue in ethics. In Plato’s ethics, in order to attain virtue, agents are epistemically obligated to provide a rational account for their orthe-doxa, correct opinion or belief. Such orthe-doxa includes the obligation of adhering to specific propositions as correct. Attaining a virtuous state necessitates the alignment of all components of the soul through cooperative effort, achieved by the obligatory obedience of the lower parts of the soul, the epithumetikon and the thumoeides, to the logistikon. The thumoeides is both cognitive and desiderative, such that it voluntarily submits to logos, thus rendering its obligation epistemic. Without the epistemic obligation of the thumoeides, an orderly virtuous state would remain unattainable.