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<p>The Church-Fitch paradox of knowability is an argument from the knowability thesis (namely the thesis that all truths are possibly known) to the omniscience thesis (namely the thesis that all truths are known). In response, van Benthem (Analysis 64(2):95–105, 2004) and others have investigated a dynamic concept of knowability. This leads to a reformulated and restricted version of the knowability thesis. I argue, however, that this concept is non-factive (i.e. not truth-entailing), whereas ‘knowable’ is factive. Holliday (Jaakko Hintikka on Knowledge and Game Theoretical Semantics. 363–394, 2018) has proposed a new dynamic concept of knowability, which comes with its own reformulated and restricted knowability thesis. I argue that, in contradistinction to the old dynamic concept, the new dynamic concept is factive (with one modification and one qualification). However, the new framework, when combined with certain epistemological theses, introduces a problem concerning the sources of new knowledge. I investigate several variations on Holliday’s framework. Each variation, however, either preserves the original problems regarding the sources of new knowledge or introduces new ones, such as dynamically possible omniscience or inescapable ignorance.</p>

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The dynamic approach to knowability

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年7月25日

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  • Jan Heylen

摘要

The Church-Fitch paradox of knowability is an argument from the knowability thesis (namely the thesis that all truths are possibly known) to the omniscience thesis (namely the thesis that all truths are known). In response, van Benthem (Analysis 64(2):95–105, 2004) and others have investigated a dynamic concept of knowability. This leads to a reformulated and restricted version of the knowability thesis. I argue, however, that this concept is non-factive (i.e. not truth-entailing), whereas ‘knowable’ is factive. Holliday (Jaakko Hintikka on Knowledge and Game Theoretical Semantics. 363–394, 2018) has proposed a new dynamic concept of knowability, which comes with its own reformulated and restricted knowability thesis. I argue that, in contradistinction to the old dynamic concept, the new dynamic concept is factive (with one modification and one qualification). However, the new framework, when combined with certain epistemological theses, introduces a problem concerning the sources of new knowledge. I investigate several variations on Holliday’s framework. Each variation, however, either preserves the original problems regarding the sources of new knowledge or introduces new ones, such as dynamically possible omniscience or inescapable ignorance.