<p>Contrary to conventionalism, intentionalism takes (most) illocutionary acts (e.g., apologizing) to be determined by the communicative intentions of speakers (e.g., intending the audience to believe that the speaker feels sorry…), instead of conventions (e.g., “sorry” is the conventional device for apologizing). However, what is the proportion of illocutionary acts determined by intentions to those determined by conventions? Intentionalism often subscribes to what I call “the disproportion thesis”: most types of illocutionary acts are performed by expressing communicative intentions, and only a few exceptions like knighting and excommunicating are determined by conventions. I will raise two arguments against the disproportion thesis. First, speakers in certain settings can be coerced to perform most types of illocutionary acts, even though they do not intend the audience to form corresponding beliefs. Second, audiences can work out the illocutionary force of most types of illocutionary acts in an anonymous setting that removes all contextual information about the speaker’s intentions. Therefore, conventional illocutionary acts have a much larger proportion; for most types of illocutionary acts, if they can be determined by intentions, they can also be determined by conventions. Finally, I will show that intentionalists embrace the disproportion thesis because they have considered only “established conventions.” Most types of illocutionary acts can be conventional because they can be determined by “derivative conventions.”</p>