<p>According to the increasingly popular Content View of de se attitudes, all de se differences boil down to a difference in content. According to a tempting argument, the truth of the Content View is fairly easy to establish just by attending to the notion of ‘content’. The argument goes like this. It is part of the concept of ‘content’ that content explains differences in (i) agents’ behaviors and (ii) the cognitive significance of agents’ attitudes. Accounting for de se phenomena consists of explaining precisely these kinds of differences (in behavior and cognitive significance). Since content, as a matter of conceptual truth, accounts for differences in (i) and (ii) more generally, content must be what explains de se differences in (i) and (ii). Although the argument boasts prima facie plausibility, it rests on an unclear premise about notion of content. The premise admits of both a weak and a strong reading. The weak reading is plausible but does not yield the desired conclusion. The strong reading yields the conclusion but is too strong to be plausible. The result: the road to establishing the truth of the Content View, if there is one, will not be easy.</p>