<p>To what extent are the cognitive processes underlying human subjective experiences, thoughts, and behaviors shaped by socio-cultural norms and values, or conversely, impervious to socio-normative influences? To explore this question, I use delusions of control as a case study. Delusions of control present two apparent paradoxes, the resolution of which may illuminate the interplay between processes permeable to socio-cultural norms and those that are not. The first is the agency attribution paradox: individuals with delusions of control exhibit both under- and over-attribution of self-agency. The second is the paradox of double social standards: delusions of control simultaneously demonstrate permeability to socio-cultural influences and imperviousness to intersubjective evidence. I argue that a version of the predictive processing theory of the sense of agency, as proposed by Leptourgos and Corlett (2020, <i>Frontiers in Big Data</i>, <i>3</i>, 27), may help resolve the agency attribution paradox and clarify some limits of socio-normative penetrability in cognitive processes. Furthermore, I suggest that the paradox of double social standards may be partly explained by metacognitive impairments and abnormally strong metacognitive feelings of confidence attached to delusional beliefs. These factors may account for both the significant role of socio-cultural priors in shaping delusional content and the resistance of delusions to change, even in the face of corrective social influences.</p>