<p>The conceptual spaces framework posits that conceptual content is structured geometrically, and is equipped with cognitive criteria of naturalness (namely, convexity and principles of cognitive economy). Its proponents suggest that cognitive naturalness is naturalness simpliciter, a novel move in a debate that is traditionally focused on how the world, and not the mind, is structured. We argue that “cognitive naturalness” is a misnomer and that the framework describes cognitive sparseness instead. To demonstrate this, we explore the approach’s shortcomings across various branches of the naturalness debate, most notably its failure to distinguish natural kinds from fictional kinds. Our diagnosis is that the evolutionary pragmatism employed by its proponents fails to establish a connection to the real world, thus failing to secure the ontological and epistemic objectivity required for a theory of naturalness. We propose an alternative view, ecological empiricism, which posits that natural concepts or properties are those revealed through interaction with the real world.</p>