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<p>Let <i>P</i> represent the totality of the fundamental physical truths, and let <i>M</i> represent the totality of non-fundamental physical truths. What is the relationship between P and M? In this paper, I argue for two related claims. The first, which I term the <i>inscrutability thesis</i>, is that there is no a priori entailment from P to M. This means that even a God-like intellect, given all the truths of P, could not deduce that M obtains without further a posteriori information. The second claim is that P alone is not metaphysically sufficient for M– or, to put it another way, that M does not supervene metaphysically on P. Rather, I argue, M supervenes on the combination of P with the totality of truths about phenomenal consciousness, represented as <i>Q</i>. I call this thesis <i>second-order idealism</i>. According to second-order idealism, if Q had been sufficiently different, then M would have been different– even if we hold P constant, and even assuming the mind-independence of P. Thus the higher-order structure of the physical world depends in part upon consciousness.</p>

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Consciousness and the structure of the world

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年3月27日

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  • Harry Cleeveley

摘要

Let P represent the totality of the fundamental physical truths, and let M represent the totality of non-fundamental physical truths. What is the relationship between P and M? In this paper, I argue for two related claims. The first, which I term the inscrutability thesis, is that there is no a priori entailment from P to M. This means that even a God-like intellect, given all the truths of P, could not deduce that M obtains without further a posteriori information. The second claim is that P alone is not metaphysically sufficient for M– or, to put it another way, that M does not supervene metaphysically on P. Rather, I argue, M supervenes on the combination of P with the totality of truths about phenomenal consciousness, represented as Q. I call this thesis second-order idealism. According to second-order idealism, if Q had been sufficiently different, then M would have been different– even if we hold P constant, and even assuming the mind-independence of P. Thus the higher-order structure of the physical world depends in part upon consciousness.