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<p>“Reduction” is a widely rejected view of how commonsense psychological notions relate to neuroscience. I argue that there is a particular view of reduction on which reduction of the key commonsense concept of ‘decision’ is a live option. In particular, I advance a version of epistemic reduction based on “connectability.” On this view, reduction relations are not logical relationships, but instead <i>posited</i> identifications that guide subsequent modeling efforts, and are substantiated if one can explain higher-level generalizations with lower-level models. I apply this view to the field of decision neuroscience, and in particular <i>accumulation to bound</i> models of decision-making. I show how this field is achieving the advantages of reductive explanation, including providing increasingly detailed and novel predictions, unifying distinct types of decisions under a single account, and explaining anomalies of rational decision-making. If I am right, the widespread anti-reductive attitude in philosophy of mind needs to be reconsidered.</p>

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Epistemic reduction of the concept of ‘decision’

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年2月5日

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  • Daniel C. Burnston

摘要

“Reduction” is a widely rejected view of how commonsense psychological notions relate to neuroscience. I argue that there is a particular view of reduction on which reduction of the key commonsense concept of ‘decision’ is a live option. In particular, I advance a version of epistemic reduction based on “connectability.” On this view, reduction relations are not logical relationships, but instead posited identifications that guide subsequent modeling efforts, and are substantiated if one can explain higher-level generalizations with lower-level models. I apply this view to the field of decision neuroscience, and in particular accumulation to bound models of decision-making. I show how this field is achieving the advantages of reductive explanation, including providing increasingly detailed and novel predictions, unifying distinct types of decisions under a single account, and explaining anomalies of rational decision-making. If I am right, the widespread anti-reductive attitude in philosophy of mind needs to be reconsidered.