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<p>In recent years, (autonomy-centered) enactivism has been used to provide an integrative and relational account of mental conditions. A significant advancement lies in its naturalized and pluralistic treatment of normativity, which transcends traditional objectivist and normativist dichotomies. This article explores the varieties of normativity within this paradigm and their implications for understanding mental conditions. We address purported challenges associated with the integration of social normativity into the enactive naturalistic framework of cognition, particularly concerning mental conditions. Drawing upon the distinction between the constitution problem and the status problem, we conceptualize mental conditions as intersubjectively constituted with an intersubjectively negotiated status. Adopting a participatory sense-making perspective, we address three challenges posed by social movements: (1) Hermeneutical dilemmas related to the ontological openness of mental health categories. (2) The difficulties and urgency to mitigate epistemic injustices. (3) The complex attribution of (social) responsibility in psychological wellbeing. In conclusion, this perspective prompts a reevaluation of epistemological assumptions, advocating for a second-person and engaged perspective on mental conditions.</p>

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Varieties of normativity and mental health: an enactive approach

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年1月16日

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  • Enara García,
  • Xabier E. Barandiaran

摘要

In recent years, (autonomy-centered) enactivism has been used to provide an integrative and relational account of mental conditions. A significant advancement lies in its naturalized and pluralistic treatment of normativity, which transcends traditional objectivist and normativist dichotomies. This article explores the varieties of normativity within this paradigm and their implications for understanding mental conditions. We address purported challenges associated with the integration of social normativity into the enactive naturalistic framework of cognition, particularly concerning mental conditions. Drawing upon the distinction between the constitution problem and the status problem, we conceptualize mental conditions as intersubjectively constituted with an intersubjectively negotiated status. Adopting a participatory sense-making perspective, we address three challenges posed by social movements: (1) Hermeneutical dilemmas related to the ontological openness of mental health categories. (2) The difficulties and urgency to mitigate epistemic injustices. (3) The complex attribution of (social) responsibility in psychological wellbeing. In conclusion, this perspective prompts a reevaluation of epistemological assumptions, advocating for a second-person and engaged perspective on mental conditions.