Scholarlink

<p>This paper examines a form of talking about speech acts, mental states, and other features so far unexplored in philosophy: quotative <i>be like.</i> Quotative <i>be like</i> is the use of <i>like</i> and <i>to be</i> that occurs in constructions such as “Ellen was like“I’m leaving!”” We argue that neglect of quotative <i>be like</i> represents a gap in our understanding of our ways of characterizing the minds and speech of ourselves and others. Further, we show that quotative <i>be like</i> is not reducible to more familiar forms of direct discourse or indirect discourse. Mapping out a number of different options for theorizing about quotative <i>be like</i>, we argue for an account on which the quoted material in quotative <i>be like</i> picks out properties.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

Quotative be like

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

    开放获取

  • 发表日期：

    2025年1月6日

查看全文
  • Andreas Stokke,
  • Derek Ball

摘要

This paper examines a form of talking about speech acts, mental states, and other features so far unexplored in philosophy: quotative be like. Quotative be like is the use of like and to be that occurs in constructions such as “Ellen was like“I’m leaving!”” We argue that neglect of quotative be like represents a gap in our understanding of our ways of characterizing the minds and speech of ourselves and others. Further, we show that quotative be like is not reducible to more familiar forms of direct discourse or indirect discourse. Mapping out a number of different options for theorizing about quotative be like, we argue for an account on which the quoted material in quotative be like picks out properties.