<p>We consider a class of <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"><math> <mi>N</mi> </math></EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$N$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation>-player nonsmooth aggregative games over networks in stochastic regimes. In such a game, the <InlineEquation ID="IEq2"> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"><math> <mi>i</mi> </math></EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$i$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation>th player minimizes a composite cost function comprising (i) a smooth expectation-valued function <InlineEquation ID="IEq3"> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"><math> <msub> <mi>f</mi> <mi>i</mi> </msub> </math></EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$f_{i}$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> that depends its own strategy and an aggregate function of rival strategies, (ii) a convex hierarchical term <InlineEquation ID="IEq4"> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"><math> <msub> <mi>d</mi> <mi>i</mi> </msub> </math></EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$d_{i}$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> that depends on its strategy, and (iii) a nonsmooth convex function <InlineEquation ID="IEq5"> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"><math> <msub> <mi>r</mi> <mi>i</mi> </msub> </math></EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$r_{i}$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> of its strategy with an efficient prox-evaluation. Although the true aggregate is unknown, players may estimate it by interacting with their neighbors. We design a fully distributed iterative proximal stochastic gradient method overlaid by a Tikhonov regularization, where each player may independently choose its steplengths and regularization parameters while meeting some coordination requirements. Under a monotonicity assumption on the concatenated gradient mapping, we prove that the generated sequence converges almost surely to the least-norm Nash equilibrium. When each <InlineEquation ID="IEq6"> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"><math> <msub> <mi>r</mi> <mi>i</mi> </msub> </math></EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$r_{i}$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> is an indicator function of a compact convex set, we establish the convergence rate for the expected gap function at the time-averaged sequence. We further derive high probability bounds for the gap function via both Markov’s inequality as well as a more refined argument that leverages Azuma’s inequality. Furthermore, we consider the extension to the private hierarchical regime, where each player is a leader with respect to a collection of private followers competing in a strongly monotone game, parametrized by leader decisions. By integrating a convolution-smoothing technique with our regularization framework, we present amongst the first fully distributed schemes for such hierarchical games. Using a Fitzpatrick gap function, we extend our rate guarantees to this setting. Notably, both sets of fully distributed schemes display near-optimal sample-complexities, i.e. computation of an <InlineEquation ID="IEq7"> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"><math> <mi>ϵ</mi> </math></EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$\epsilon $</EquationSource> </InlineEquation>-Nash equilibrium requires <InlineEquation ID="IEq8"> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"><math> <mi mathvariant="script">O</mi> <mo stretchy="false">(</mo> <mn>1</mn> <mo stretchy="false">/</mo> <msup> <mi>ϵ</mi> <mrow> <mn>2</mn> <mo>+</mo> <mi>δ</mi> </mrow> </msup> <mo stretchy="false">)</mo> </math></EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$\mathcal{O}(1/\epsilon ^{2+\delta })$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> oracle evaluations where <InlineEquation ID="IEq9"> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"><math> <mi>δ</mi> <mo>&gt;</mo> <mn>0</mn> </math></EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$\delta &gt; 0$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation>. This suggests that the hierarchical structure has little impact from the standpoint of performance degradation. Finally, numerical experiments on a networked Nash-Cournot problem and its hierarchical generalization demonstrate the beneficial impact of regularization.</p>

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A Distributed Iterative Tikhonov Method for Networked Monotone Stochastic and Hierarchical Aggregative Games

  • Jinlong Lei,
  • Uday V. Shanbhag,
  • Jie Chen

摘要

We consider a class of N $N$ -player nonsmooth aggregative games over networks in stochastic regimes. In such a game, the i $i$ th player minimizes a composite cost function comprising (i) a smooth expectation-valued function f i $f_{i}$ that depends its own strategy and an aggregate function of rival strategies, (ii) a convex hierarchical term d i $d_{i}$ that depends on its strategy, and (iii) a nonsmooth convex function r i $r_{i}$ of its strategy with an efficient prox-evaluation. Although the true aggregate is unknown, players may estimate it by interacting with their neighbors. We design a fully distributed iterative proximal stochastic gradient method overlaid by a Tikhonov regularization, where each player may independently choose its steplengths and regularization parameters while meeting some coordination requirements. Under a monotonicity assumption on the concatenated gradient mapping, we prove that the generated sequence converges almost surely to the least-norm Nash equilibrium. When each r i $r_{i}$ is an indicator function of a compact convex set, we establish the convergence rate for the expected gap function at the time-averaged sequence. We further derive high probability bounds for the gap function via both Markov’s inequality as well as a more refined argument that leverages Azuma’s inequality. Furthermore, we consider the extension to the private hierarchical regime, where each player is a leader with respect to a collection of private followers competing in a strongly monotone game, parametrized by leader decisions. By integrating a convolution-smoothing technique with our regularization framework, we present amongst the first fully distributed schemes for such hierarchical games. Using a Fitzpatrick gap function, we extend our rate guarantees to this setting. Notably, both sets of fully distributed schemes display near-optimal sample-complexities, i.e. computation of an ϵ $\epsilon $ -Nash equilibrium requires O ( 1 / ϵ 2 + δ ) $\mathcal{O}(1/\epsilon ^{2+\delta })$ oracle evaluations where δ > 0 $\delta > 0$ . This suggests that the hierarchical structure has little impact from the standpoint of performance degradation. Finally, numerical experiments on a networked Nash-Cournot problem and its hierarchical generalization demonstrate the beneficial impact of regularization.