<p>The electronic industry is critically analyzing embedded devices against fault injection attacks as it has become a precondition to detect attacks at the preproduction level. Performing dependability analysis and fault tolerance even before the physical prototype of the target device is available is quite challenging. Simulation-based techniques (SFI) provide valuable solutions for performing early analysis at the initial stage of the target device. However, current approaches still present some drawbacks, such as working for specific CPU architecture, requiring code instrumentation, or maybe a different target, i.e., design errors instead of dependability analysis. To overcome such issues, this work proposes a simulation-based setup mechanism for generating Plundervolt attacks so that industry experts can perform dependability analysis of fault injection attacks at the hardware level. Experimental results for generating a Plundervolt attack depict that the attack was effectively generated from time duration (<InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <InlineMediaObject> <ImageObject Color="BlackWhite" FileRef="11227_2025_7906_Article_IEq1.gif" Format="GIF" Height="19" Rendition="HTML" Resolution="72" Type="Linedraw" Width="19" /> </InlineMediaObject> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$T_{p}$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"><math> <msub> <mi>T</mi> <mi>p</mi> </msub> </math></EquationSource> </InlineEquation>) 18.003–180.043 ms for glitch voltage (<InlineEquation ID="IEq2"> <InlineMediaObject> <ImageObject Color="BlackWhite" FileRef="11227_2025_7906_Article_IEq2.gif" Format="GIF" Height="19" Rendition="HTML" Resolution="72" Type="Linedraw" Width="18" /> </InlineMediaObject> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$V_{g}$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"><math> <msub> <mi>V</mi> <mi>g</mi> </msub> </math></EquationSource> </InlineEquation>) ranging from 5 to 0.3V at 2 KHz frequency. Constant/repeated Plundervolt attack was generated for time duration (<InlineEquation ID="IEq3"> <InlineMediaObject> <ImageObject Color="BlackWhite" FileRef="11227_2025_7906_Article_IEq1.gif" Format="GIF" Height="19" Rendition="HTML" Resolution="72" Type="Linedraw" Width="19" /> </InlineMediaObject> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$T_{p}$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"><math> <msub> <mi>T</mi> <mi>p</mi> </msub> </math></EquationSource> </InlineEquation>) 198.0 5–306.085 ms from the 5–0.3–5 V supply voltage. An overvolting attack was also generated successfully for the time duration (<InlineEquation ID="IEq4"> <InlineMediaObject> <ImageObject Color="BlackWhite" FileRef="11227_2025_7906_Article_IEq1.gif" Format="GIF" Height="19" Rendition="HTML" Resolution="72" Type="Linedraw" Width="19" /> </InlineMediaObject> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$T_{p}$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"><math> <msub> <mi>T</mi> <mi>p</mi> </msub> </math></EquationSource> </InlineEquation>) = 2 ms with glitch voltage <InlineEquation ID="IEq5"> <InlineMediaObject> <ImageObject Color="BlackWhite" FileRef="11227_2025_7906_Article_IEq2.gif" Format="GIF" Height="19" Rendition="HTML" Resolution="72" Type="Linedraw" Width="18" /> </InlineMediaObject> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$V_{g}$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"><math> <msub> <mi>V</mi> <mi>g</mi> </msub> </math></EquationSource> </InlineEquation>= 306.1–382.9 pV. The device under test (DUT) taken was an 8051 microcontroller. The fault injection attack impact is observed and analyzed on the embedded device: microcontroller 8051 (<InlineEquation ID="IEq6"> <InlineMediaObject> <ImageObject Color="BlackWhite" FileRef="11227_2025_7906_Article_IEq6.gif" Format="GIF" Height="12" Rendition="HTML" Resolution="72" Type="Linedraw" Width="15" /> </InlineMediaObject> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$\mu$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"><math> <mi>μ</mi> </math></EquationSource> </InlineEquation>51). Results found were constant/repeated glitching (from 198.050 to 306.085 ms) Plundervolt attack on the 8051 microcontroller successfully skips important instructions and causes bit flip.</p>

Plundervolt attack: A novel simulation-based fault injection attack against embedded systems for accelerating dependability analysis process

期刊论文
发表日期：

2025年10月9日

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Shaminder Kaur,
Ashish Sachdeva,
J. Chinna Babu

摘要

The electronic industry is critically analyzing embedded devices against fault injection attacks as it has become a precondition to detect attacks at the preproduction level. Performing dependability analysis and fault tolerance even before the physical prototype of the target device is available is quite challenging. Simulation-based techniques (SFI) provide valuable solutions for performing early analysis at the initial stage of the target device. However, current approaches still present some drawbacks, such as working for specific CPU architecture, requiring code instrumentation, or maybe a different target, i.e., design errors instead of dependability analysis. To overcome such issues, this work proposes a simulation-based setup mechanism for generating Plundervolt attacks so that industry experts can perform dependability analysis of fault injection attacks at the hardware level. Experimental results for generating a Plundervolt attack depict that the attack was effectively generated from time duration ( $T_{p}$ $T_{p}$ ) 18.003–180.043 ms for glitch voltage ( $V_{g}$ $V_{g}$ ) ranging from 5 to 0.3V at 2 KHz frequency. Constant/repeated Plundervolt attack was generated for time duration ( $T_{p}$ $T_{p}$ ) 198.0 5–306.085 ms from the 5–0.3–5 V supply voltage. An overvolting attack was also generated successfully for the time duration ( $T_{p}$ $T_{p}$ ) = 2 ms with glitch voltage $V_{g}$ $V_{g}$ = 306.1–382.9 pV. The device under test (DUT) taken was an 8051 microcontroller. The fault injection attack impact is observed and analyzed on the embedded device: microcontroller 8051 ( $\mu$ $μ$ 51). Results found were constant/repeated glitching (from 198.050 to 306.085 ms) Plundervolt attack on the 8051 microcontroller successfully skips important instructions and causes bit flip.