<p>In this article I analyze the presuppositions and arguments of the Russian religious philosopher Sergey A. Alekseev (Askoldov) in his critique of Kantian philosophy. A comparison is made between Askoldov’s philosophical views and the early phenomenology of Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl. The analysis is carried out in both conceptual and terminological dimensions. I proceed from the distinction between a term and a word of natural language. This means that one and the same word can designate different terms as opposed to the thesis that one and the same term can change its meaning. Particular attention is paid to the terms ‘<i>a priori</i>’ and ‘transcendent’, ‘natural point of view’, as well as to the terms ‘metaphysics’ and ‘objective’. Several directions of Askoldov’s criticism of Kant’s philosophy are distinguished: 1. The distinction between experience and that which is outside of experience. 2. Dependence of the object of cognition on the cognizing subject. The object external to cognition is labelled by Askoldov as ‘transcendent’. 3. Identification of the cognizing subject with an impersonal cognitive faculty. According to Askoldov, only the individual subject can be the source of cognition as a process. 4. Apriorism as a premise of necessity and universality of judgements in scientific cognition. Any cognition has, according to Askoldov, an empirical source. 5. Kant’s primacy of scientific knowledge over pre-scientific knowledge. Askoldov believes that pre-scientific knowledge is a necessary element in scientific knowledge. The conclusion reveals the objective grounds for the divergence of the philosophical concepts of Kant and Askoldov.</p>