<p>This article examines legal subjecthood through a comparative reading of Western personhood and the Islamic juristic concept of the mukallaf. Its target is not the Western legal tradition as such, nor the language of rights, but a narrower problem that emerges when legal subjecthood is explained primarily through right-holding without an equally precise account of accountable agency. The article therefore engages rights theory, especially Hohfeldian analysis and Interest Theory, while asking a further question: how does a legal order identify the subject who can be addressed by a binding norm, respond to it, and be held answerable for its breach? Western traditions already contain many resources for this question, including Roman status, medieval and canon-law personhood, natural-law and social-contract accounts, constitutional balancing, social democracy, and Catholic social doctrine. Yet the Islamic concept of the mukallaf gives the issue a distinctive clarity by linking legal responsibility to taklif, ahliyyah, dhimmah, and the juristic distribution of huquq Allah and huquq al-ibad. The article argues that rights remain indispensable as juridically protected interests, but that legal subjecthood in its accountable sense requires a theory of obligation-capacity. The mukallaf, read alongside but not against persona, supplies such a model and offers a constructive contribution to contemporary debates on human dignity, public welfare, artificial intelligence, environmental personhood, and institutional accountability.</p>