<p>The defamation action between Johnny Depp and Amber Heard exposed a jurisprudential puzzle within adjudication. Although the trial formally resolves disputes through propositional proof—testing statements capable of being true or false—public attention centred on demeanour, affect, and the visual force of photographic exhibits. No logical contradiction appeared sufficient to determine credibility; instead, attention shifted to features of the proceedings that did not themselves take propositional form. This Article argues that the tension, as experienced in practice, reflects an unexamined assumption about how correspondence must be tested. Drawing on Peircean semiotics, it reconceives the common law trial as an institutionalised inquiry into the durability of truth-claims. Propositions articulate representational claims about past events, but because those events are absent, correspondence cannot be verified by inspection. Adversarial procedure instead subjects articulated claims to structured normative testing. Non-propositional elements—such as demeanour, tone, and visual presentation—do not function as independent truth-makers; they bear on whether a proposition can sustain its representational status under disciplined challenge. Reinterpreting doctrines governing visual evidence and hearsay through this durability model, the Article shows that evidentiary law regulates rather than suppresses non-propositional force as part of mediated correspondence. Truth in common law trials thus emerges through the endurance of propositions under adversarial inquiry.</p>

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Juridical Visuality and the Semiotics of Truth in Common Law Trials

  • Adrian Baihui Chan

摘要

The defamation action between Johnny Depp and Amber Heard exposed a jurisprudential puzzle within adjudication. Although the trial formally resolves disputes through propositional proof—testing statements capable of being true or false—public attention centred on demeanour, affect, and the visual force of photographic exhibits. No logical contradiction appeared sufficient to determine credibility; instead, attention shifted to features of the proceedings that did not themselves take propositional form. This Article argues that the tension, as experienced in practice, reflects an unexamined assumption about how correspondence must be tested. Drawing on Peircean semiotics, it reconceives the common law trial as an institutionalised inquiry into the durability of truth-claims. Propositions articulate representational claims about past events, but because those events are absent, correspondence cannot be verified by inspection. Adversarial procedure instead subjects articulated claims to structured normative testing. Non-propositional elements—such as demeanour, tone, and visual presentation—do not function as independent truth-makers; they bear on whether a proposition can sustain its representational status under disciplined challenge. Reinterpreting doctrines governing visual evidence and hearsay through this durability model, the Article shows that evidentiary law regulates rather than suppresses non-propositional force as part of mediated correspondence. Truth in common law trials thus emerges through the endurance of propositions under adversarial inquiry.