<p>The question of whether human rights are natural, universal, or socially constructed remains central in contemporary philosophy. This paper examines John Searle’s theory of social ontology as a framework for understanding the ontological status of rights. Searle’s account of institutional facts, collective intentionality, and deontic powers offers a distinctive perspective on how rights emerge from shared linguistic and social practices. Within this framework, human rights are conceived not as metaphysical absolutes but as status functions grounded in collective recognition and maintained through institutional structures. This analysis highlights the strengths of Searle’s approach in explaining the social reality of rights while also engaging with its limitations, particularly regarding the universal validity of human rights and the challenges posed by cultural relativism and power asymmetries. By situating human rights within the ontology of social reality, the paper contributes to ongoing debates in philosophy and political theory about the foundations, legitimacy, and future of human rights discourse.</p>