<p>This article examines the transformation of legal language in the context of digitalization through the philosophical-legal thought of Arthur Kaufmann. Moving beyond both positivist formalism and interpretive subjectivism, Kaufmann conceives law as a historically situated, analogical, and fundamentally linguistic practice oriented toward justice. By analyzing key elements of his hermeneutic framework—such as pre-understanding, analogy, legal typology, and the centrality of the person—the paper argues that legal meaning does not preexist interpretation nor can it be reduced to computable structures. Instead, it emerges through responsible interpretive judgment within normative constraints. The increasing translation of legal language into algorithmic and digital forms risks impoverishing its semantic complexity, displacing interpretive responsibility with technical formalism, and marginalizing the human dimension of law. Drawing on Kaufmann’s insights, the article contends that any integration of digital technologies into law must preserve its irreducibly human, relational, and interpretive nature.</p>