<p>This article introduces and applies a novel analytical framework—distinguishing between micro- and macro-perspectives—to re-examine dual (two-element) normative structures within seminal legal theories. It argues that this explicit distinction, often merely implicit in existing analyses, provides a more nuanced understanding and facilitates a richer reinterpretation of the contributions of Hans Kelsen, H.L.A. Hart, and Eugenio Bulygin. The micro-perspective centers on the functional logic of individual norm-pairs, whereas the macro-perspective addresses the systemic role of entire classes of norms. Applying this dichotomy, the article re-evaluates Kelsen’s concepts of primary/secondary norms and <i>Doppelnorme</i>, Hart’s primary/secondary rules, and Bulygin’s applicative/applicable norms. The analysis demonstrates how these influential theories often implicitly favour one level of analysis, and how a conscious application of both perspectives can reveal previously underemphasized dimensions, resolve apparent limitations, and underscore the underlying complementarity of these key contributions to analytical jurisprudence. The article concludes by discussing the significant theoretical and methodological implications of this micro–macro analytical approach for the general theory of norms and for legal dogmatics. It suggests the approach’s utility in clarifying the complex interplay of normative elements that constitute modern legal orders and in fostering a more integrated understanding of classical legal thought.</p>