<p>This paper examines the enduring challenge of achieving objectivity in constitutional interpretation, a fundamental concern in legal theory and practice. Constitutions, as value-laden and often abstract documents, require interpretation that inevitably engages with complex questions of language, history, and moral reasoning. The paper begins by defining the constitution and the nature of constitutional interpretation, then examines the historical evolution of interpretive methodologies. It critically evaluates major theories—including originalism (intent and public meaning), textualism, purposivism, living constitutionalism, and moral readings—assessing their respective claims to objectivity and the extent to which they mitigate subjective judicial influence. In response to the limitations of existing theories, the paper proposes a synthesized framework of “Objectively Grounded Constitutionalism” (OGC). This approach emphasizes a hierarchical and verifiable method rooted in constrained textualism, original public meaning, objective systemic purpose, and doctrinal stability. OGC seeks to balance historical fidelity with methodological transparency, thereby offering a principled path toward minimizing subjectivity in judicial reasoning. Ultimately, the paper argues that while perfect objectivity may remain elusive, rigorous interpretive discipline and fidelity to foundational legal commitments can substantially constrain arbitrariness and preserve the legitimacy of constitutional adjudication.</p>