<p>This paper critically examines the traditional notion of legal interpretation within German jurisprudence, highlighting its semiotic and sociological limitations and underlying ideology. Although German legal culture sees interpretation as a neutral and deductive extraction of meaning from statutory texts, this ideal contrasts sharply with contemporary hermeneutic insights and empirical studies of judicial decision-making. By employing a dual theoretical lens, the article first argues—drawing from legal semiotics and discourse theory—that interpretive methods primarily serve as mechanisms for legitimizing judicial decisions within the broader legal discourse. Second, applying Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of <i>habitus</i>, it demonstrates how legal practitioners internalize interpretive conventions, shaping intuitive judgments through institutional conditioning rather than strict deductive reasoning. The core thesis advanced here is that interpretive methods foster coherence and legitimacy not because they are inherently rational or objective, but because they are culturally perceived and institutionally accepted as rational, thereby creating semiotic stabilization within a structured social framework. This symbolic function sustains the coherence, predictability, and legitimacy of the German legal system despite interpretive plurality and methodological critiques.</p>