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<p>Signaling theory posits that investors rely on quality signals from entrepreneurial teams (ETs) to assess their capacity to build successful new ventures. We examine how accurately investors evaluate these signals when funding project-based enterprises (PBEs)—temporary, single-purpose ventures characterized by extreme uncertainty. In this context, investors face challenges in interpreting signals from both ETs and their affiliated distributors promoting PBEs’ product. Short project lifecycles limit investors’ ability to monitor ET behavior, while distributors face rapidly shifting consumer preferences. Studying the film industry, we investigate how the commercial reputations of ETs and distributors influence investment in PBEs, as well as PBEs’ subsequent commercial success. We reveal a disconnect: ET reputation is a stronger predictor of investment than of commercial success. In contrast, distributor reputation more reliably predicts commercial success, though it is overlooked by investors. These results suggest that investors may misinterpret key reputation signals, making a separating equilibrium between high- and low-quality PBEs unlikely. We contribute to signaling theory by highlighting the misalignment between signals that attract investment and those that predict success in high-uncertainty, project-based ventures.</p>

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Picking the right signals? Investor assessment of reputation signals of entrepreneurial teams and distributors in project-based enterprises

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

    开放获取

  • 发表日期：

    2025年8月5日

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  • Angelo Tomaselli,
  • Salvatore Torrisi,
  • Joris Ebbers

摘要

Signaling theory posits that investors rely on quality signals from entrepreneurial teams (ETs) to assess their capacity to build successful new ventures. We examine how accurately investors evaluate these signals when funding project-based enterprises (PBEs)—temporary, single-purpose ventures characterized by extreme uncertainty. In this context, investors face challenges in interpreting signals from both ETs and their affiliated distributors promoting PBEs’ product. Short project lifecycles limit investors’ ability to monitor ET behavior, while distributors face rapidly shifting consumer preferences. Studying the film industry, we investigate how the commercial reputations of ETs and distributors influence investment in PBEs, as well as PBEs’ subsequent commercial success. We reveal a disconnect: ET reputation is a stronger predictor of investment than of commercial success. In contrast, distributor reputation more reliably predicts commercial success, though it is overlooked by investors. These results suggest that investors may misinterpret key reputation signals, making a separating equilibrium between high- and low-quality PBEs unlikely. We contribute to signaling theory by highlighting the misalignment between signals that attract investment and those that predict success in high-uncertainty, project-based ventures.