Rational inattention: The interplay of stakes and prior beliefs in a laboratory study
摘要
The theory of rational inattention posits that individuals maximize expected utility net of information costs, which are often modeled using mutual information. A key prediction of this framework is that posterior beliefs are invariant to prior probabilities. We test this prediction using a novel auditory-information experiment. Our results reveal a clear violation of this prediction: under low-stakes conditions, we observe a simple behavioral asymmetry that is inconsistent with invariance. We then introduce a reduced-form hybrid specification, defined as a convex combination of Bayesian updating–based mutual-information costs and hypothesis testing–based log-likelihood-ratio costs, to quantify the relative empirical contributions of the two components. Within this hybrid specification, the estimated marginal cost of Bayesian learning is positively related to the marginal cost of Type I decision errors, and the estimated weight on the mutual-information component is approximately 0.60 for the modal group of subjects.