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<p>Political realists have criticised moralist theories of legitimacy for allegedly neglecting the close relationship between descriptive legitimacy—the extent of subjects’ acceptance of state rule—and normative legitimacy—the state’s right to rule. They claim that, while realist theories, which ground normative legitimacy directly in subjects’ acceptance, can capture this relationship, moralist theories fail to do so. This paper counters this critique by demonstrating that the realist account of the relationship is unappealing to moralists and that moralist theories, properly understood, can indeed account for the close relationship between descriptive and normative legitimacy. Using Matthias Brinkmann’s Moral Value View, which grounds normative legitimacy in the state’s ability to realise moral values, I argue that subjects’ acceptance contributes to normative legitimacy through two routes: (1) an instrumental route, where acceptance facilitates the effective governance capabilities necessary for the ability to realise moral values, and (2) a constitutive route, where acceptance itself embodies or promotes moral values that ground normative legitimacy through the state’s ability to realise them. Additionally, I identify a potential virtuous cycle: not only does descriptive legitimacy contribute to normative legitimacy, but rule by a normatively legitimate state may enhance descriptive legitimacy in return.</p>

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Rescuing Descriptive Legitimacy from Political Realism for Political Moralism

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年3月6日

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  • Gen Fukushima

摘要

Political realists have criticised moralist theories of legitimacy for allegedly neglecting the close relationship between descriptive legitimacy—the extent of subjects’ acceptance of state rule—and normative legitimacy—the state’s right to rule. They claim that, while realist theories, which ground normative legitimacy directly in subjects’ acceptance, can capture this relationship, moralist theories fail to do so. This paper counters this critique by demonstrating that the realist account of the relationship is unappealing to moralists and that moralist theories, properly understood, can indeed account for the close relationship between descriptive and normative legitimacy. Using Matthias Brinkmann’s Moral Value View, which grounds normative legitimacy in the state’s ability to realise moral values, I argue that subjects’ acceptance contributes to normative legitimacy through two routes: (1) an instrumental route, where acceptance facilitates the effective governance capabilities necessary for the ability to realise moral values, and (2) a constitutive route, where acceptance itself embodies or promotes moral values that ground normative legitimacy through the state’s ability to realise them. Additionally, I identify a potential virtuous cycle: not only does descriptive legitimacy contribute to normative legitimacy, but rule by a normatively legitimate state may enhance descriptive legitimacy in return.