<p>This article discusses the justification of jurisdictional rights in the context of public reason liberalism. Public reason liberals emphasize the importance of jurisdictional rights within liberal social morality. For them, recognizing jurisdictional rights is at the same time an implication of the liberal premise that persons are free and equal moral agents and a condition for living together based on liberal principles and institutions. I argue, however, that while the public justification of jurisdictional rights is based on solid ground, at least if we accept some fundamental liberal premises, the possibility of justifying a <i>specific system</i> of jurisdictional rights is less obvious. I identify several difficulties related to the perception of moral externalities and collectively harmful practices that explain why, for each potential system of rights, some persons may have intelligible and decisive reasons to reject it. Ultimately, the choice seems to be between a form of sectarian public reason liberalism where some reasons based on selected perspectives are arbitrarily discarded and the promotion of a more inclusive social contract with potential illiberal implications.</p>