<p>In Chap.&#xa0;3 of his excellent book, Thomas Søbirk Petersen argues that there are good reasons in favour of employing so-called hostile design to prevent begging, loitering, and rough sleeping, and that four of the most prominent objections to this suggestion fail to persuade. By hostile design, Petersen has in mind the use of techniques such as tilted benches, steam vents, and spikes on the ground, as well as alterations to the urban acoustic environment, that are designed to prevent people from loitering, begging, or rough sleeping. This paper argues two things. First, it argues that the three arguments Petersen suggests could be offered in favour of the use of hostile design to prevent loitering, rough sleeping, and begging face practical challenges that make them less persuasive than they may appear at first glance. If this is true, then the positive case for employing hostile design is severely weakened. Second, it suggests that at least one of the objections to employing such designs, a rationality-based objection, that Petersen dismisses can be given a more robust formulation which is not as susceptible to Petersen’s critique. If this is true, then this considerably strengthens the case against employing hostile design to prevent loitering, rough sleeping, and begging.</p>

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Should Hostile Design Be Used To Prevent Begging, Loitering, and Rough Sleeping?

  • Sebastian Jon Holmen

摘要

In Chap. 3 of his excellent book, Thomas Søbirk Petersen argues that there are good reasons in favour of employing so-called hostile design to prevent begging, loitering, and rough sleeping, and that four of the most prominent objections to this suggestion fail to persuade. By hostile design, Petersen has in mind the use of techniques such as tilted benches, steam vents, and spikes on the ground, as well as alterations to the urban acoustic environment, that are designed to prevent people from loitering, begging, or rough sleeping. This paper argues two things. First, it argues that the three arguments Petersen suggests could be offered in favour of the use of hostile design to prevent loitering, rough sleeping, and begging face practical challenges that make them less persuasive than they may appear at first glance. If this is true, then the positive case for employing hostile design is severely weakened. Second, it suggests that at least one of the objections to employing such designs, a rationality-based objection, that Petersen dismisses can be given a more robust formulation which is not as susceptible to Petersen’s critique. If this is true, then this considerably strengthens the case against employing hostile design to prevent loitering, rough sleeping, and begging.