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<p>I revisit the debate between Joseph Raz and H.&#xa0;L.&#xa0;A. Hart concerning the nature of legal content and reasoning. Raz contended that legal reasoning should be analyzed as a form of moral reasoning. In contrast, Hart emphasized the distinction between legal and moral content, proposing that legal reasoning is a form of what I will call social-institutional reasoning. I characterize social-institutional reasoning in terms of the agent-relative, domain-specific, universal, and content-insensitive justifications it draws upon. I evaluate Raz’s moralized analysis and argue that it obscures the distinctive contribution that law’s social and institutional grounds play in our understanding of law. By analyzing legal content in moral terms, Raz’s approach obscures the very thing that&#xa0;positivism is well-placed to elucidate: the distinctively social-institutional character of legal reasoning.</p>

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Law in Society: Defending Hart

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  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年6月12日

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  • Alma Diamond

摘要

I revisit the debate between Joseph Raz and H. L. A. Hart concerning the nature of legal content and reasoning. Raz contended that legal reasoning should be analyzed as a form of moral reasoning. In contrast, Hart emphasized the distinction between legal and moral content, proposing that legal reasoning is a form of what I will call social-institutional reasoning. I characterize social-institutional reasoning in terms of the agent-relative, domain-specific, universal, and content-insensitive justifications it draws upon. I evaluate Raz’s moralized analysis and argue that it obscures the distinctive contribution that law’s social and institutional grounds play in our understanding of law. By analyzing legal content in moral terms, Raz’s approach obscures the very thing that positivism is well-placed to elucidate: the distinctively social-institutional character of legal reasoning.