<p>It seems natural to think that protest for an unjust cause is unjustified. But citizens of a liberal democracy will inevitably disagree over which causes of protest are just. Accordingly, a theory that makes the justification of protest depend on its cause may seem somehow incompatible with the circumstances of democratic politics. For these reasons, it is unclear how theories of the justification of political protest should approach their subject. In this paper, I examine both sides of the problem. I begin with a basic ethical argument to support the intuition that the justification of protest should depend on its cause. I then consider the objection that such theories are politically untenable, and so useless. Finally, I argue that the objection fails: even if people disagree about the justice of a protest’s cause, they may be able to agree on the criteria by which we should evaluate the protest. I conclude that there is nothing in principle wrong with theories that make the justification of protest depend on its cause.</p>