<p>This paper contributes to the larger body of literature examining whether religious faith can coexist with doubt. In particular, I defend the view that there is a species of doubt—namely, when S suspends judgment about p—that is not necessarily opposed to faith. First, I revisit the Chrisian view of doubt as sin, which typically involves either (a) a willful refusal to believe some divinely revealed proposition or (b) a culpable indifference to it. Next, I demonstrate that a different case exists: S may withhold judgment on p not out of willful rejection, but because she sees that her reasons for believing or disbelieving p are incommensurable. In such a situation, S’s rational choice between either option becomes undefined. S then doubts p not because she wilfully rejects it but because it is rational for her to refrain from adopting an attitude towards p on incommensurable grounds. In the end, I argue that such a case of doubt, because it mimics rational deliberation, can be construed as an intellectual virtue.</p>